This article challenges claims by revisionist historians that in July 1914 the Royal Navy was on the verge of instituting a "naval revolution" based on the ideas of Admiral Sir John Fisher. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, was not prepared to rely on Fisher's concept of "flotilla defence" in the North Sea, as revisionists contend. Nor did he wish to send capital ships to distant waters. He increasingly looked to submarines to protect Britain's interests in the Mediterranean, a secondary theatre, but he still believed that Britain must maintain a preponderance of strength over Germany in capital ships in the North Sea. Churchill's strategic views were generally conservative. He hoped that new designs or new technologies would one day allow submarines to supplant battleships, and he actively supported measures that might help to make this possible. But there is no evidence that he and his naval advisers were ready to gamble on a radical departure in force structure or naval strategy on the eve of the First World War.
the narrow seas around Britain, the navy's capital ships -ideally battle-cruisers -would be free to defend British trade and imperial interests in distant waters.
These radical ideas encountered such strong opposition within the Royal Navy that Fisher was unable to achieve the transformation he sought during his initial tenure as First Sea Lord. The revisionists contend, however, that Fisher's goals were later embraced by Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty from 1911-1915, who was on the verge of instituting Fisher's proposed "naval revolution" when the First World War began in late July 1914. This argument rests on Lambert's claims that Churchill and his top naval advisers decided secretly in 1914 to cancel two of the proposed four dreadnought battleships in the navy's 1914-15 new construction programme in order to finance an expanded programme of submarines and torpedo craft. This, it is argued, amounted to the explicit -though still secret -abandonment of Britain's traditional policy of measuring naval power in terms of battleships. On this basis, the revisionists maintain that the Admiralty had accepted Fisher's radical schemes as the best solution to the Royal Navy's ever-increasing financial problems. 4 This part of the revisionist argument is problematic, however. There is ample evidence to demonstrate that Churchill and his professional advisers were contemplating major changes to the navy's new construction programme for 1914-15, but claims that the Royal Navy was on the verge of a truly revolutionary change in its force structure are difficult to sustain. This article will demonstrate that British naval policy in the months leading up to the outbreak of war was at once more complicated and more conservative than the revisionists have suggested.
Nicholas Lambert has presented a compelling case that, in broad terms, the Royal Navy's leadership in the decade prior to the First World War had a more progressive outlook on new technology than previous accounts had allowed. British admirals, in short, recognised that the submarine and the torpedo would have a major impact on how navies operated, and were not all obsessed with battleships and decisive fleet actions. But with little documentary evidence to explain why the Admiralty was considering major alterations in the 1914-15 construction programme, the revisionists have made two critical -and mistaken -assumptions. The first is that
Churchill and his advisers ultimately accepted the radical schemes advocated by Fisher in toto.
There is no reason, however, to think that battle-cruisers and "flotilla defence" were an inseparable combination for anyone but Fisher himself. The revisionists do not allow for the possibility that
Churchill was willing to decouple these two goals, and consequently fail to recognise his real objective in 1914: to adopt a form of "flotilla defence", but only in a secondary theatre of operations, and primarily as a means to strengthen Britain's concentration of capital ships in the critical North Sea theatre. The second assumption is that Britain possessed only a single naval "standard" during this period. In fact, the Royal Navy employed several different standards between 1912 and 1914, and two of these directly regulated battleship strength. 5 It is therefore misleading to speak of a "strict battleship standard" being abandoned. The revisionists erroneously conclude that discussions of standards in 1913-14 related solely to preparations against Germany in the North Sea. But only one of the two battleships standards in place at the time -that pertaining to the Mediterranean -was likely to be scrapped in 1914. And this was not, as the revisionists contend, evidence that the navy's faith in the battleship had dramatically weakened. On the contrary, dropping the "battleship standard" in a subsidiary theatre was an implicit reaffirmation of the Admiralty's faith in the battleship in the main and decisive theatre, and the need to maintain the existing standard there.
When Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in October 1911, the navy had already acknowledged the seriousness of the German and American naval challenges by abandoning its traditional policy of maintaining a "two-power standard" in capital ships measured against the next two strongest naval powers. In 1909 the Admiralty decided that British security would be preserved by maintaining a superiority of sixty per cent in capital ships over Germany alone.
Churchill announced the new standard to Parliament in March 1912 while introducing the navy's annual estimates for 1912-13. The two power standard had been a reasonable guide, he explained, when "the next two strongest naval Powers were France and Russia, and when those two Powers were also the what one might call the most probable adverse diplomatic combination".
But the rise of the German navy had transformed the situation. Britain now faced "a very powerful homogenous Navy, manned and trained by the greatest organising people of the world, obeying the authority of a single Government, and concentrated within easy distance of our shores". It was therefore time, he maintained, to "readjust our standards in closer accord with the actual facts and probable contingencies". 6 Churchill also announced that Britain would build two additional capital ships for every one added to the existing German programme. These were expensive commitments, as the new German navy law of 1912 signalled Germany's plans not just to build more dreadnoughts, but also to keep a higher percentage of warships in full commission at all times, significantly increasing the immediate striking power of the High Seas fleet.
Churchill was determined to maintain the sixty per cent margin of superiority over Germany in dreadnought battleships, but he regarded new construction as only a partial solution to the German naval threat: Britain would also need to concentrate its capital ships as far as possible in home waters, where they would be immediately available in the event of a crisis. He announced in March 1912 that battleships would be withdrawn from the Mediterranean for this purpose. The revisionists maintain that Fisher wanted the Royal Navy to be equally capable of protecting British home waters, trade routes, and imperial possessions. All of these, Sumida argues, "were vital -one could not be emphasized at the expense of the others without risk of disaster". 7 Churchill took a different view. The foundation of his naval strategy prior to the First World War was the primacy of British home waters over all other theatres and requirements. In his opinion, Britain had at all times to retain a pronounced numerical superiority over the German fleet in the North Sea, which he regarded as the decisive theatre in any future war. "[M]astery on the seas" did not depend, he noted in January 1912, "on the simultaneous occupation of every sea."
On the contrary it depends upon ability to defeat the strongest battlefleet or combination wh[ich] can be brought to bear. This ability cannot be maintained by a policy of dispersion.
The sea is all one, and war is all one. The supreme strategic principle of concentration of superior force in the decisive theatre ... must govern all naval dispositions. ... Dispersion of strength, frittering of money, empty parades of foolish little ships 'displaying the flag' in unfrequented seas, are the certain features of a policy leading through extravagance to defeat.
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The "first of all the laws of war", he later explained to the Secretary of State for War, was "overpowering strength at the decisive point". As desirable as it was to be strong everywhere, British finances would not allow it: Churchill rightly judged that his colleagues in the Liberal government would build no more capital ships than were needed to maintain the 60 per cent margin over its main rival. Britain simply could not afford a crushing numerical superiority over Germany in the North Sea while also matching the fleets of Germany's allies, Austria-Hungary There were obvious risks involved in stripping the Mediterranean of capital ships, but
Churchill believed these would have to be accepted. To minimize the danger, he initially contemplated relying on flotilla vessels at Gibraltar and Alexandria to protect British interests in the absence of a battle fleet. 10 The influence here of Fisher, who was acting as a sort of unofficial adviser to Churchill at this time, is obvious. "Let the French take care of the Mediterranean," the Admiral urged Churchill in March 1912, "and a hot time they'll have of it with submarines poking about in that lake. We are well out of it!" 11 The prospect of denuding the Mediterranean of battleships generated little enthusiasm within the Admiralty, however, and provoked a storm of criticism from other quarters, as many feared that the withdrawal of capital ships would badly damage British prestige in peacetime and leave national interests vulnerable in wartime. 12 In May 1912, Churchill tried to satisfy his critics by agreeing to station two modern battle-cruisers at
Gibraltar, but he continued to face strong pressure in Cabinet to maintain a full battle squadron in the Mediterranean. Fearing that this would lead to a reduction of Britain's strength in the North Sea, Churchill was determined to resist. Fisher was one of those encouraging him to stand firm.
"The margin of power in the North Sea is irreducible", the Admiral wrote, "and requires this addition of the Mediterranean battleships."
Is it proposed to build another fleet for the Mediterranean, and also perhaps for China, and so on? We cannot have everything or be strong everywhere. It is futile to be strong in the subsidiary theatre and not overwhelmingly supreme in the decisive theatre. 13 Churchill made his case to the Cabinet in June. The pre-dreadnought battleships currently in the Mediterranean were simply no match for the new Austrian and Italian dreadnoughts, he warned. In wartime, they "would only be a cheap and certain spoil." He was therefore opposed to leaving these ships at Malta solely to "keep up appearances. It would be a bluff which would deceive nobody". 14 Only the most modern warships would be any use in the Mediterranean, and
Britain could not afford to maintain a two-power standard in the Mediterranean against Italy and Austria-Hungary and preserve a 60 per cent. margin over Germany in the North Sea. "This would be a very extravagant policy," he remarked, "and is not necessary to the fundamental safety of the British Empire or to our ultimate victory and supremacy at sea." He clearly did not regard flotilla defence as an ideal solution, but he insisted that there was no other realistic choice. "It must be plainly recognised that we must adopt the rôle in this minor theatre appropriate to the weaker naval Power," he wrote, "and while in the North Sea we rely on the gun as our first weapon, we must in the Mediterranean fall back mainly on the torpedo." To make this idea more attractive to the Cabinet, he pointed out that these flotillas would probably never be tested, as Britain would likely have the support of the French navy in the event of war. The two navies together should match the combined forces of Italy and Austria-Hungary, and Churchill advocated "a definite naval arrangement" with France to help secure British interests in the region. 15 The subject was referred to the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) on 4 July 1912. After obtaining Cabinet sanction for the acceleration of the British ships, Churchill wrote privately to Borden stressing the importance of the Canadian dreadnoughts to imperial security.
The situation was complicated, however, by Churchill's plans for Britain's 1914-15 programme of new construction. The naval staff was investigating means to increase the number of submarines in the annual estimates the following year without increasing the overall cost of new construction. 27 Churchill had no desire to see these plans wrecked for the sake of laying down additional battleships for the Mediterranean. He therefore explained to Borden that if the Canadian dreadnoughts were not approved by the following spring, when the annual estimates were submitted to parliament, the Admiralty would probably expand its submarine fleet rather than build additional capital ships of its own. "My naval colleagues", he informed Borden, "consider that for less money than 3 capital ships would cost, we could by a greatly increased flotilla construction in the narrow seas liberate 3 ships for general service." The difficulty with this course was that Churchill -with the consent of the Cabinet -had publicly stated that the Canadian dreadnoughts were needed to meet an emergency. This pronouncement had been intended to make it easier for Borden to secure domestic support for his naval program, but it made it difficult for the Admiralty not to build the additional dreadnoughts itself if the Canadian contribution failed to materialize.
David Lloyd George, proposed to drop two of the four dreadnoughts included in the following year's programme. Their reasons were mainly financial. The navy estimates for 1911, the year Churchill arrived at the Admiralty, had been £42.4 million. Since then, naval expenses had increased drastically. Britain was building more ships than before, at a greater individual cost, and was also keeping more vessels in commission. The number and pay of naval personnel was also increasing, and a new naval air service had been created. Churchill's proposed estimates for 1914 came to nearly £50.7 million, and he warned that an additional £2 million might become necessary if shipyards made more rapid progress than expected on vessels already under construction. This represented an increase of nearly 25 per cent in naval expenditure in just four years. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was faced with the prospect of raising taxes in the coming year, was alarmed by the size of Churchill's estimates, and did not believe that a small reduction in the capital ship programme would jeopardize British security. To his colleagues, he argued that four dreadnoughts were not needed that year to maintain 60 per cent superiority over Germany, and that such a large programme would be "distinctly provocative" at a time when Anglo-German relations were improving. and to the preservation of 60 per cent superiority over Germany. If the Cabinet -which had not protested against these commitments when they were made -now repudiated them, Churchill's position would be untenable and he was prepared to resign. The situation was further complicated by his public declarations that the Canadian dreadnoughts were required to meet a naval emergency. It would be highly damaging to Churchill if the government demonstrated that there was no emergency, and that the situation was in fact so secure that it could afford to reduce Britain's own programme. Moreover, any chance of obtaining the Canadian ships would be wrecked. Churchill also claimed to be alarmed about the repercussions in Germany. The construction programme outlined in 1912 had been the stick with which he hoped to induce the Germans to accept his proposals for a mutual "naval holiday" in new battleship construction. 32 Churchill's thoughts on this subject. Matching Austrian dreadnoughts with British dreadnoughts represented "no more than a plain and simple interpretation" of the one-power standard, he concluded.
The obvious method of meeting like with like would impose an unbearable strain on our resources. We must therefore seek safety in some disconcerting variation. To do the same thing as your enemy but on a smaller scale is futile. If you cannot be superior, you must be different. We are justified in adopting less direct methods of maintaining our position in a secondary theatre than are required in the North Sea.
Rather than build three additional British dreadnoughts to maintain a precise one-power standard,
Churchill suggested that Mediterranean requirements might be met by increasing the speed of two battleships in the current programme and building additional vessels in other classes, including twelve submarines and eight fast destroyers. This would allow Britain to maintain a squadron of five fast capital ships in the Mediterranean by 1915. Such a "force is not directly comparable to the Italian or Austrian fleets", he conceded, but we consider that its speed and quality would enable it, if well handled, to seize any opportunity of striking a heavy blow which a temporary weakness of the enemy might offer, and to avoid being brought to action in unfavourable circumstances. It is peculiarly well adapted to protecting British trade in the Mediterranean, and could continually harass and injure the enemy. We are of opinion that such a force would in fact though not in form meet the requirements of the "One Power Standard" prescribed. The acceleration of two battleships from the 1914 programme was approved in February, despite strong opposition from some ministers. But the Cabinet was not willing to commit itself to any future increase in Britain's capital ship programme for the sake of the Mediterranean.
According to Asquith, it was agreed "that Parliament should be clearly informed that in the event of Mr Borden's continued default, the British government was under no obligation to supply the 3 missing Canadian ships, and that our standard of construction is to be maintained at 60%". while Germany would complete only two. This "great military fact", he remarked, altered "the whole proportion of battle strength between the fleets". In his opinion, this development was "one of the strongest justifications for a general review of types". 43 Not long afterward, he observed to his private secretary that "the European situation has so greatly improved and the German increase has been so largely overhauled by our exertions" that it would now be safe to begin scrapping a large number of obsolescent warships, a policy he had planned to pursue when he came to the Admiralty but which had been shelved following the German naval increases in 1912. Churchill's views on the future of the battleship were complex. He was well aware of the claims being made in some quarters that submarines and aircraft would one day make big gun capital ships obsolete; he believed this outcome would probably be realised as new technologies were developed; and he was eager that the Royal Navy should be at the forefront of progress in this area.
But at the same time he was conscious of the limitations of existing technology, and he was cautious about abandoning a proven type of warship prematurely. On 10 November 1913, he told an audience at the Guildhall that the "question has often been raised whether the great ships of the Dreadnought era will some day follow the mammoth and the mastodon into a convenient and highly desirable extinction".
Those who believe that that time will come -and they are a considerable school -point with a warning finger to the ever-growing power of the submarine, and to the new and expanding possibilities of the air, and they ask whether the day will not come when, guided by information out of the sky, a blow may not be struck beneath the water which will be fatal to the predominance of great capital ships, at any rate in the narrow seas. Surface speed is the dominant characteristic required of the Ocean submarine. This speed is not tactical but strategical. The Ocean submarine (or submarine cruiser) must have sufficient speed to overhaul a battle fleet so as to make sure of being able to anticipate it at any point, or to get ahead of it in order to dive and attack. Such vessels attack by getting there and being overtaken. 24 knots would be an ample margin of speed for Ocean submarines. These vessels cruise under escort and fight alone. They must be protected by other vessels when on the surface; and be guided by them to their point of attack.
Churchill suggested that three or four of these vessels should be grouped together into a submarine flotilla along with two fast light cruisers. Each flotilla would be "considered equal as a decisive fighting unit to a first class battleship or battle cruiser". 51 Thus, the submarine would only be capable of supplanting the battleship when a new class had been developed capable of achieving a speed around 24 knots.
During the latter half of 1913 Churchill was eager to develop an efficient "ocean" submarine, and he supported the construction of experimental boats that promised to meet his speed requirements. But he also wanted to expand Britain's existing fleet of overseas submarines in order to restore Britain's ability to maintain a close watch on the German coast. The Royal Navy had successfully employed this strategy in previous wars, but when Churchill arrived at the Admiralty in 1911 it was clear that developments in submarines, aircraft, mines and torpedoes made such a policy extremely dangerous. The navy's plans for close military blockade were therefore dropped early in 1912. The Admiralty war staff initially contemplated its replacement with an "intermediate" or "observational" blockade, which would keep the main British fleet in its own northern waters while cruisers and destroyers patrolled a line extending mid-way through the North Sea between Britain and Germany. 52 Churchill was never enthusiastic about this plan, and it was dropped after the 1912 manoeuvres demonstrated that it was not practicable. 53 Towards the end of the year, the naval staff began to outline plans for what became known as a distant blockade.
The British fleet would now be held in Scottish waters in order to block Germany's exits from the North Sea. Churchill was not enthusiastic about this strategy either, fearing that it would leave the main fleet poorly positioned to stop a German attempt to invade Britain, attack its coastline, or interfere with the transportation of an expeditionary force to France.
Distant blockade also struck Churchill as an unduly passive policy, and he was instinctively drawn to the idea of using submarines and other flotilla vessels to reestablish a close blockade of the German coast. 54 At an Admiralty conference on submarine policy in early December 1913, a consensus was reached that priority should be given to the construction of "overseas" submarines for blockading purposes. The main proponent of developing the "ocean" submarine on this occasion was the First Lord. The Director of Naval Construction produced a design for 24 knot ocean submarine using steam propulsion, and Churchill was eager to proceed with the construction of more than one of these vessels. His professional advisers were more cautious, however. Britain already had two experimental steam submarines under construction at the time, HMS Swordfish and HMS Nautilus, and they felt that these should be completed and tested before any commitment was taken to producing a new and untried design. This was a prudent decision. The steam-driven K-class "fleet" submarines produced during the First World War proved to be a notable failure. 55 In December 1913 the Admiralty decided to build only one experimental 24-knot submarine; additional vessels would be considered in late 1914. 56 Churchill was impatient, however, and was soon under pressure from the Cabinet to effect economies in the 1914-15 estimates. He therefore informed the Sea Lords on Christmas day 1913 that they must press ahead with the development of the proposed new design that would "supply us with ocean submarines of the required speed and sea-going qualities". He concluded that if these were "to be constructed they must be a substitute for the battleship preponderance and paid for out of money that would have otherwise have gone into battleships". 57 Churchill was evidently confident that the Royal Navy was on the verge of building a successful "ocean" class (or "fleet") submarine, and he was eager to have some of these vessels ready at the earliest date possible. If the new design proved to be successful, he undoubtedly contemplated a transformation of the navy's force structure. But the technology for this new class of submarine was as yet untested. Churchill was not attempting to initiate a "naval revolution" at this time so much as he was gambling part of his budget on research and development that might make a future revolution possible. And even then, he did not regard this new class of submarines as the backbone of an asymmetric strategy of "flotilla defence", as the revisionists argue, but rather as a means of augmenting the traditional line of battle with a new type of warship to enhance its offensive capabilities in the North Sea against its German counterpart.
While Churchill attempted to further this goal, it also appeared that a relatively modest expansion of Britain's "overseas" submarines would allow the navy to revive the policy of close blockade. These considerations, together with the need for a larger flotilla in the Mediterranean, all pointed in the same direction: an immediate expansion of the submarine fleet. In late December 1913, Churchill and the naval staff began actively exploring the possibility of replacing one or maybe two battleships in the 1914-15 programme with submarines. 58 There is no doubt, as
Lambert has shown, that Churchill was a driving force behind the idea of an "extraordinary" substitution policy. In an unpublished draft chapter of The World Crisis, Churchill describes how he explained the rationale for his policy to Lloyd George and worked out an agreement, later endorsed by Asquith, allowing the Admiralty to replace two of its capital ships for that year with torpedo vessels of equivalent value. 59 The timing of this agreement is not clear, although there is no basis for Sumida's claims that a deal was secretly concluded in January 1914, even as the Cabinet debates over the naval estimates were taking place. 60 It seems more likely that Churchill waited until his preparations were further advanced before approaching the Treasury, in which case an agreement was probably reached between April and early July 1914. In the event, the First Lord only began to press the naval members of the Board of Admiralty for a decision on the substitution programme in July.
Churchill himself was enthusiastic about proceeding. "I am convinced that the time has come for action", he wrote to Battenberg on 12 July, "and although the steps are serious I do not feel any anxiety about taking them. They will add greatly to the war power of the Fleet and bring credit to all associated with them." 61 The options under consideration in mid-July 1914 were that the only substitution he would recommend was two of the Polyphemus class cruisers for destroyers. 66 He was thus clearly in favour of the full programme of four battleships that year.
Churchill's proposed Polyphemus-class cruiser enjoyed some support within the Admiralty, but Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, the Chief of the Admiralty's War Staff, prepared two memoranda on 24 July outlining his strong reservations. These ships were relatively expensive to build, he noted, but they offered no clear advantage over existing types of warship. Like other surface vessels, they would be no substitute for submarines in a blockade; and with their low freeboard they would be little use for defending or attacking trade on the high seas. They were fast enough to accompany a battle fleet, but in a fleet action they would be vulnerable to the enemy's destroyers, which presented a smaller target for torpedoes. Most importantly from Churchill's perspective, Sturdee maintained that battleships could not "be replaced by any number of Polyphemus's". He was sympathetic to the need to reduce costs, but the best course at this time, in his opinion, was to "develop the Submarine for oversea attack and maintain our Battleship strength by Battleships to overpower those of the enemy". 67 The views expressed by these senior decision-makers in July 1914 generally bear out the substitution option open, this late start would ensure that the cost of the vessels was kept to a minimum in the fiscal year in which they were voted, which was the normal practice before Churchill adopted the expedient of "accelerating" some ships in a given year. The starting dates of the four battleships were therefore staggered. The gun mountings ordered by the Admiralty on 27
July were intended for the two "contract" battleships that had already been ordered. Additional gun mountings for the two dockyard ships would not have been required for several more months at least. Thus, while there is no certainty that the final two battleships would have been started if the war had not intervened, there is equally no proof that they had definitely been abandoned. The Third Sea Lord, responsible for naval procurement, certainly did not believe any decision had been taken in July. He addressed a minute to Churchill and Battenberg on 24 August enquiring as to the fate of the final two battleships. "The design of these vessels has received considerable consideration," he noted, "as also the possibility of substituting other classes of vessels for them, but a decision had not been reached up to the outbreak of war." The question was settled two days later, when Churchill minuted that the remaining ships would not be proceeded with. 70 The revisionists claim that Churchill and his professional advisers planned to transform naval He was willing to do so because the battle cruisers so deployed were not required to maintain the approved margin of superiority over Germany in the North Sea. In other words, Churchill deployed some battle cruisers abroad because he believed Britain's superiority in capital ships in home waters had effectively neutralized the German threat, not because he believed that flotilla defence made it safe to denude the North Sea of heavy ships.
Sumida also asserts that in early 1914 the Admiralty had decided "to create a battle cruiser force in the Pacific, and was in the process of implementing the plan when the war broke out in August". 71 Churchill's policy was, in fact, the opposite of this. As First Lord, he believed that the principle of concentration in the decisive theatre applied to the Pacific with even greater force than to the Mediterranean. He therefore substituted pre-dreadnought battleships for the two British battle-cruisers that the Admiralty had agreed to provide for the Pacific in the 1909 agreement with the Dominions. During the course of 1913, he went further still and attempted to substitute older vessels for the modern Bristol-class cruisers that had been earmarked for New Zealand waters.
And finally, in March 1914, Churchill announced his goal of creating a new "Imperial Squadron"
of fast capital ships. This force would be nominally available for "imperial service" in the Pacific, but it would normally be stationed at Gibraltar in peacetime, where it would be immediately available for deployment to the North Sea or the Mediterranean. This force was supposed to include the heavy ships financed by Canada, New Zealand and Malaya, but also, Churchill hoped, the new Australian battle-cruiser, HMAS Australia, which he feared would otherwise remain tied to the Pacific. 72 Churchill's goal in 1914 with respect to the Pacific was thus to deprive it of battle-cruisers and other modern ships until such time as there emerged an immediate and pressing threat in the region that justified detaching ships from more important theatres. 73 The revisionists have performed a valuable service by articulating, with great force and insight, the revolutionary ideas developed by Jacky Fisher during his first term as First Sea Lord 
